Events
Is There a Better Way to Contain Iran?
On October 20 The Global Policy Institute, GPI, and Bay Atlantic University, BAU, convened a panel of international experts titled:
Is There a Better Way to Contain Iran?
The purpose of this webinar discussion was to analyze the impact of US sanctions against Iran and assessing the opportunities for more productive ways to engage Iran.
Panelists
Fazle Chowdhury, Adjunct Faculty, Bay Atlantic University (Washington, DC)
Dr. Arzu Celalifer Ekinci, Senior Iranian Affairs Analyst and Consultant, (Ankara)
Professor Riccardo Redaelli, Director of the Center for Research on the Southern System and Wider Mediterranean (CRiSSMA), Catholic University, (Milan)
Michel Makinsky, General Manager, Ageromys International, (Paris)
Moderator
Paolo von Schirach, President, Global Policy Institute, Chair of Political Science and International Relations Programs, Bay Atlantic University
Event Recording:
Event Summary:
In 2015 the P5 + 1 countries came to an agreement with Iran (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, otherwise known as the “Iran Nuclear Deal”) with the goal of freezing the Iranian nuclear program. In May 2018 President Trump withdrew the US from the agreement and ordered sanctions against Iran, claiming that the JCPOA did not go far enough in constraining Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions. The sanctions were supposed to force Iran back to the negotiating table. However, after a few years of heavy sanctions, there are no new negotiations and consequently no new deal in sight. Indeed, there is no sign of a possible compromise between Washington and Tehran. The EU would like to keep the old agreement alive. But this looks very difficult. Where do we go from here? Is there any indication that the US sanctions will eventually force Iran to agree on substantial policy changes, not just on its nuclear program, but also on its policies towards the Region? Or do we need a new approach?
Overall, the panelists agreed that the US sanctions have not produced the desired effect of forcing Iran to change behavior, nor have they created a more favorable climate for new negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program or regional issues. Chowdhury opened the discussion by providing a detailed account of how the deep problems affecting the Iranian economy have worsened significantly because of the US sanctions. However, he also pointed out that there is no sign of Iran being forced to change course on the nuclear or any other issue raised by Washington because of the negative impact caused by the economic sanctions. The Iranian people suffer. But the regime is still very much in control. Ekinci argued that from a Turkish perspective there is no indication that the sanctions imposed on Iran by the Trump administration are working in the desired manner. She pointed out that, after decades of sanctions imposed upon them for a variety of reasons, the Iranians are used to economic hardships and they are very creative in designing ways to circumvent sanctions. Redaelli pointed out that if the goal of the sanctions was to weaken the regime, if anything, they have had the opposite effect. The hardliners in Tehran are now stronger. So, sanctions are not just ineffective. They are counterproductive. Makinsky indicated that in principle there are legal means to conduct at least some business transactions between Europe and Iran, as long as the sectors involved fall under the umbrella of humanitarian activities. European countries look for legal loopholes to engage with Iran; but they also cognizant of possible negative reactions from Washington. Regarding the possibility of turning a page in order to find a better way to deal with Iran, all the panelist were cautious in assessing the possibility of any breakthroughs via novel approaches. Nonetheless, they all concurred that improvements are possible. Ekinci pointed out that, if the stated or implicit goal of US policies towards Iran is regime change, nothing substantial will be possible. Both Redaelli and Makinsky indicated that even a change of administration in Washington after the November 3 elections would not automatically create a better atmosphere. Makinsky pointed out that even the Obama administration (in which Joseph Biden had the role of Vice President) which negotiated and promoted the Iran Nuclear Deal did not implement in full of its provisions, leaving some sanctions in place. This caused misgivings in Tehran. Redaelli noted the contradiction between a hardline government in Iran and a rather secular and in many instances pro-Western and even pro-American Iranian society. However, he also added that the regime is strong and cannot be displaced.
Ekinci added that Turkey could play a positive role in improving relations with Iran. She pointed out that relations between Ankara and Tehran, while not friendly, are inspired by pragmatism and realism. The two countries are neighbors. They share a border. There is clear awareness on both sides that crises in one country would most likely spill over into the other. Chowdhury pointed out how so many opportunities for improving the Washington Tehran bilateral relationship have been missed or wasted. Right now, much will depend on the outcome of the upcoming US presidential elections and of the elections that will take place in Iran in 2021. Redaelli agreed that it would not be productive to try anything new at this time. He also warned that most likely the Iranian leadership that will emerge out of the elections will be more radical than what we have now. Led by Makinsky, the panelists agreed that, down the line, it may be possible to envisage step by step diplomatic engagements aimed at discussing regional issues, while recreating a separate track for nuclear talks. Finally, all panelists, led by Ekinci, agreed that the recent warming up of relations between Israel, Bahrain and the UAE, culminating in the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the two Gulf States and Israel, is an indication of their shared concerns about Iranians intentions in the region. However, these realignments, while notable, are unlikely to affect the overall picture of US-Iran relations in any significant way.